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Draft Recommendation 
on the future of European security 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the joint interest of all its members is to promote collective security so as to 
consolidate peace and promote detente and disarmament; 
Considering that Europe has to face a threat that is now formidable because of the Soviet 
Union's superiority in many fields; 
Considering that the Soviet Union's operations beyond the European continent extend this threat 
to the economic and political fields; 
Considering that Europe's security can be guaranteed only by the cohesion and strength of the 
Atlantic Alliance and the resolve of its members; 
Considering that the fulfilment of this requirement calls for close agreement between the 
European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance on their joint defence policy; 
Considering that the situation requires the European element of the Alliance to make a greater 
effort to take part in joint defence and disarmament initiatives, particularly with regard to 
conventional weapons; 
Considering that, to be effective, this effort implies close co-operation in the production of 
armaments; 
Considering that the European Community has established solidarity between most European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance so that on many matters they are in a position to express joint 
views on questions which are outside the Community's purview; 
Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty, with the North Atlantic Treaty, constitutes the 
basis of European security; 
Considering that the European Community is not in a position to replace WEU in exercising 
that organisation's defence and armaments responsibilities but that steps should be taken here and 
now to face up to the requirements of European security, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Set up a working group to examine measures to be taken by all member countries to adapt WEU 
to the present requirements of European defence and instruct it to study in particular: 
(a) the co-ordination of member countries' policies in its areas of responsibility, namely defence, 
armaments and disarmament; 
(b) the participation of Ministers of Defence or their representatives in its meetings when matters 
which concern them are discussed; 
(c) the convening of meetings before those of the North Atlantic Council with a view to 
identifying the joint views of its members on matters relating to Europe's security; 
(d) the question of inviting all countries which are members of the EEC, have applied for 
" membership or are European members of NATO also to negotiate their accession to the 
modified Brussels Treaty or, if they do not wish to do so, their association with the activities 
ofWEU; 
(e) the action to be taken on the study being conducted by the Standing Armaments 
Committee so that the outcome may be a true European armaments policy. 
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Draft Resolution 
on the future of European security 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the WEU Assembly remains the only European assembly with responsibilities 
in defence questions; 
Considering that the election of the parliamentary assembly of the European Communities by 
direct universal suffrage gives that assembly new authority in the framework of the Rome Treaty; 
Considering it desirable to establish links between these two assemblies, 
DECIDES 
l. To instruct the Presidential Committee, on its initiative, to consider with the Bureau of the 
assembly of the European Communities the possibility of organising an exchange of observers 
between the two assemblies; 
2. To instruct its President to examine with the President of the European Parliament all the 
questions raised by this exchange of observers; 
3. To instruct the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee to contact the Chairman of the 
Political Committee of the assembly of the European Communities with a view to co-ordinating the 
political work of the two assemblies. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. von Hassel, Rapporteur) 
I. Europe's security aims 
I. There were about eight million victims 
during the first world war in Europe. In the 
second world war, almost 45 million Europeans 
were killed. The subsequent growth in arma-
ments, and nuclear armaments in particular; 
has been such that there is every reason to 
think that a third world war would leave Eur-
ope in a state of almost total devastation and 
that the population would be practically wiped 
out, even if nuclear weapons were not used. 
But this is hardly probable. It is enough to 
glance at a map of the world to see that Europe 
could not be spared in the event of hostilities 
between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. Its wealth, its population and the narrow 
confines between the iron curtain and the 
shores of the Atlantic make i.t a -vital stake 
and any future war will inevitably be fought on 
its soil. 
2. There is therefore no interest, whether 
national or ideological, which would warrant 
the risk of any European country or nation 
sparking off a war. This fact cannot and does 
not escape any of the Western European coun-
tries and, since the end of the second world 
· war, no European government has even thought 
of using force, let alone done so, to obtain 
benefits of any kind whatsoever, at least in 
Europe. 
3_ No political party, whether in govern-
ment or in opposition, has ever considered war 
as a means of attaining aims of any kind what-
soever. This means that some have accepted a 
situation which, in another age, would have 
seemed intolerable, such as the division of Ger-
many and the German people and the situation 
imposed on Berlin. But no one, in Germany 
or elsewhere, has done anything to start a war 
that might change this situation. No one has 
even considered doing so. Consequently, any 
accusations that may have been levelled at a 
European state, or even a party, of militarism, 
revanchism or aggressiveness are and were un-
fair, completely unfounded and slanderous. 
They are, and remain, dangerous insofar as they 
are liable to incur or perpetuate mistrust for 
which today there is no justification but which 
may sow discord between nations with common 
situations and aims. 
4. Peace can be secured only if an opponent 
refrains from the idea that an attack on Western 
Europe could be of advantage to him. The 
West's policy must also be a defence policy, 
which means the opponent is deterred from any 
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attack or pressure. This policy is no longer 
conceived as an instrument of a foreign policy 
directed towards the attainment of national 
goals but merely as a means of ensuring secur-
ity, i.e. peace, no longer for one country or an-
other, but for the whole of Europe, since no 
one can hope to evade a war which might break 
out on the European continent. 
5. This desire for peace does not mean that 
Europe is not prepared to make the sacrifices it 
considers necessary to defend its freedom. The 
whole population of all the countries of Europe 
has steadfastly accepted such sacrifices because 
it realised the need for them. Most Western 
European countries have compulsory military 
service for their youth. All spend a consider-
able proportion of their gross national product 
on maintaining and equipping their armed for-
ces. When, in 1979, it became apparent that 
an additional financial effort was necessary to 
ensure Europe's security, all the members of 
NATO accepted the principle of an annual in-
crease of at least 3 % in constant values in their 
defence budgets, in spite of the difficulties they 
were all experiencing due to a long-term 
deeply-rooted economic recession. 
6. Thus, there can be no ambiguity in Eur-
ope's attitude towards everything contributing 
to a policy of detente. All Europeans seek 
detente in East-West relations provided it does 
not weaken their security. They all have the 
same interest in limiting as far as possible the 
sacrifices which they have to make to ensure 
their defence. But they cannot agree to a 
foreign policy which diminishes the effect of 
these sacrifices, i.e. which jeopardises their 
security. 
7. The policy of detente cannot therefore be 
separated from Europe's overall defence pol-
icy. It is closely linked with and an integral 
part of defence policy since it seeks to streng-
then security while reducing expenditure on 
armaments. It is therefore an unassailable res-
ponsibility of Western European Union under 
the modified Brussels Treaty. It has long been 
prominent in WEU's work and the Assembly 
has on many occasions examined its aspects 
and implications, even after nine-power Europe 
took over many of these questions in the frame-
work of political consultations between the nine 
governments. 
8. Disarmament and the limitation of arma-
ments have always been a major aim of Euro-
peans but only in the framework of a global 
policy which includes consultations amongst 
allies and negotiations with the Sovied Union, 
its allies and all countries concerned. In 
varying ways and to a greater or lesser extent 
they have all taken part in disarmament nego-
tiations, particularly in the framework of the 
Geneva Disarmament Committee. The United 
Nations special session on disarmament in 1978 
showed the interest and importance of disarma-
ment for European countries whichever alliance 
they belonged to or whether they were neutral 
or non-aligned. Europe played a decisive role 
at that session and was very largely responsible 
for the changes then made in the composition 
and methods of work ofthe Disarmament"Com-
mittee. 
9. Although the European countries were 
not asked to take a direct part in the SALT 
negotiations, they have followed them very clo-
sely, particularly in their consultation~ with 
their American partner, and have made It clear 
that they wish them to be successful as long as 
they do not in any way compromise Europe's 
security. Similarly, the European members of 
NATO have taken part in the MBFR talks and 
have tried to make them advance in the same 
direction. 
10. Your Rapporteur points out that after 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan some politi-
cians were heard to say that the only way to 
overcome the mounting tension would be by a 
policy of disarmament. Your Rapporteur is in 
favour of all serious talks on disarmament. 
But those who believe this might be a remedy 
for the crisis should note that the Geneva Com-
mittee held its 867th meeting in 1980 without 
recording any major results in terms of Euro-
pean security and disarmament. The least that 
can be said is that its work is desperately slow, 
even assuming that there is still hope of some 
outcome. Naturally, events in 1979 and 1980, 
particularly the invasion <?f . Afghanistan, . d~d 
nothing to raise hopes and It IS now unrealistic 
to base a policy on disarmament which would 
be tantamount to responding to a succession of 
challenges to Western Europe's security by a 
display of weakness and an attitude of appease-
ment the effects of which would probably be 
the r~verse of the aim sought, i.e. the consolida-
tion of peace. Indeed, at the present juncture, 
the development of detente and disarmament 
cannot be envisaged without, to say the least, a 
new appraisal of the threats to international 
peace and an assessment of the forces deployed 
by the Soviet Union and its allies. 
11. Any initiatives the Soviets may take at 
present in the name of detente and disarma-
ment do not seem to be aimed at achieving 
concrete results based on maintaining the bal-
ance and developing peaceful relations but 
rather at undermining the unity of Europe and 
the Atlantic Community and weakening their 
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determination to continue to make the sacri-
fices necessary for their security. 
12. Europe's freedom is indivisible and the 
West must do its utmost to avoid being carried 
away by proposals which conceal such dangers. 
In facing up to the implications of the pre-
sent situation and examining the threats facing 
Europe our sights must be set firmly on the <?b-
jective of security based on detente and effective 
disarmament. 
13. Soviet moves to denounce NATO as a 
militarist, aggressive or revanchist undertaking 
must be discounted straight away. The Atlan-
tic Alliance is in fact purely defensive and 
NATO is in no way designed for an offensive 
policy, nor an offensive strategy: NATO is 
absolutely unable to attack. There are there-
fore no grounds for ideas that the West should 
show understanding for the Soviet Union 
which feels itself surrounded and hence threat-
ened by the West. Such views take no account 
of the Soviet Union's perfect knowledge of the 
text of the North Atlantic Treaty, the structure 
of NATO and the democratic decision-taking 
machinery of all the member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance under parliamentary supervi-
sion. The Soviet Union fully realises what it 
is doing in pursuing, for political purposes, this 
line of propaganda which seeks to divide the 
West and weaken its defence effort. The West 
must not forget that peace in Europe since 1945 
cannot be attributed to international opinion, 
the United Nations Charter and its application 
or talks on detente and disarmament but only 
to the balance of force guaranteed by NATO 
which alone has given certain shape - still ill-
defined - to an international order which it 
alone maintains. This means that however 
great may be the attachment to peace and the 
desire to bring about real disarmament and 
detente on the part of the members of the 
Atlantic Alliance, they would be running 
counter to their aims if they did not first seek to 
maintain -or at the present juncture, restore-
the balance ~ithout which there can be neither 
peace nor law. 
II. Threats to European security 
1. Political aspects 
14. The seizure of power by the Communist 
Party in Russia in 1917 introduced a comple-
tely new concept of international relations on 
the part of the Bolcheviks. They saw the Rus-
sian revolution. merely as a step towards world 
revolution and revolution in any one country 
meant the power, army and external policy 
of the Soviet Union being placed at the service 
of that revolution. Since then, therefore, the 
cause of revolution and that of the Soviet 
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Union have become merged in the eyes of 
communist leaders the world over -admittedly 
with a few exceptions such as Tito in Yugosla-
via and Mao Tse-tung and his successors in 
China. Hence, they consider that it is the class 
struggle - which they believe to be history's 
principal driving force - which is expressed in 
international relations and that this struggle 
cannot come to an end until communists have 
assumed power throughout the world. 
15. However, this does not mean the Soviet 
Union is prepared to leap blindly into any ven-
ture in the name of revolution. On many past 
occasions, it has shown great flexibility in 
implementing its schemes and has applied them 
very realistically. As long as the "capitalist 
world " has sufficient cohesion and force to 
inflict defeat or intolerable losses on the Soviet 
Union in the event of open hostilities, the latter 
will be deterred from taking the risk of a 
direct confrontation, in Europe at least, as long 
as it knows the West will not hesitate to use its 
full force to ensure its security. This has led it 
to use other means of weakening the capitalist 
side, leaving itself room to build up its strength 
and perhaps, tomorrow, to win the day while 
avoiding open confrontation. 
16. But such means can be deployed only 
under cover of Soviet strength. The Soviet 
Union has therefore started to build up what is 
probably the largest and best equipped army in 
the world, forming a navy equal to the strongest 
in the world, i.e. that of the United States, and 
developing nuclear power equal to that of its 
potential enemy in every field and which now 
in many respects is in the lead. 
17. The economic and social cost of this tre-
mendous armaments effort has been consider-
able and has left the Soviet people far behind 
Western Europe and the United States in terms 
of personal consumption. To impose these 
sacrifices, the Soviet Government has for seve-
ral decades had to maintain a dictatorship diffi-. 
cult to tolerate and a main effect of which has 
been the complete isolation of the population 
to prevent it from knowing the true situation in 
the rest of the world. This dictatorship is an 
essential condition for the success of Soviet 
external policy. 
18. A revolutionary policy has been worked 
out for countries where capitalism is firmly 
entrenched which includes weakening western 
positions outside Europe and cutting the west-
em countries off from their essential resources, 
particularly Middle East oil and ores for the 
European market mainly from southern Afri-
ca. It is from every point of view in the inte-
rests of the Soviet Union to win over to its 
ideological system the countries recently freed 
from colonialism or bring them under its domi-
nation. If at one time it had such illusions, its 
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experience with China certainly quelled them. 
The communist order is intended for indus-
trialised countries in which it can lean on a 
large and organised working class, but marxist 
logic, which here corresponds to a fairly realis-
tic assessment of the facts, holds that capitalism 
is inherently condemned to expand continually 
and consequently all forces opposing such 
expansion can halt it and thus provoke its self-
destruction. 
19. That is why the Soviet Union has no 
hesitation in encouraging all movements capa-
ble of destabilising regions whose production or 
markets may be useful to the West and to this 
end it relies equally on nationalist forces and 
religious, ethnic or economic movements. 
This does not mean the Soviet Union gives 
equal support and assistance to all such forces 
but it is liable to make use of them or even stir 
them up if they are likely to play a role in 
world strategy. This is probably the explana-
tion for the operations instigated or supported 
by the Soviet Union in South-East Asia, the 
Near and Middle East and Africa. 
20. A look at a map of the Indian Ocean 
indicating all the subversive movements encou-
raged, aided or provoked by the Soviet Union 
and its conquests and those of its allies in the 
past five years would show a threefold pincer-
movement closing on the ocean through which 
most MisJdle_Eastoil has to pass: much of the_ 
oil consumed by the United States, 60% of that 
consumed by Western Europe and 90% of 
Japanese requirements. As long as the West 
remains as dependent as it now is on oil 
imports from the Middle East, the ability to 
close the Persian Gulf will give the Soviet 
Union strong means of pressure. The West 
has of course sensed the danger and taken steps 
to allow it to escape this pressure in the future, 
first by building up oil reserves which now 
amount to about four months' consumption 
and second by developing, as decided in Venice 
in June 1980, alternative forms of energy for 
the western economy to depend less closely on 
Middle East oil, its price and supply routes. 
However, the effects of these measures will be 
felt only in the long term and, for the next ten 
years at least, the West will remain very largely 
dependent on that area of the world. 
21. On the eastern side of the Indian Ocean, 
the three claws of the pincer are clearly discern-
ible: the seizure of the whole of Vietnam by a 
pro-Soviet regime, the domination of Laos, the 
conquest of Cambodia and the outbreak of 
fighting between Vietnam and Thailand in June 
1980 indicate that the Indochinese peninsula is 
in the process of falling entirely into the hands 
of the Soviet Union or its friends. The inva-
sion of Afghanistan in December 1979 allowed 
the Red Army, in crossing the highest moun-
tain barrier in the world, to come 500 km closer 
to the Strait of Hormuz from which it is now 
separated only by a crumbling Iranian state and 
the .Baluchi province of a singularly weakened 
~a~Istan. Fmally, the third claw of the pincer 
IS m the northern Near East where the Soviet 
Union is encouraging continuous internal dis-
turbances in Turkey with several hundred vic-
tims of terrorism each month, where Syria 
seems on the brink of another revolution and 
Iraq has an army almost entirely equipped by 
the Soviet Union. 
22. In face of this direct or indirect thrust by 
the Soviet Union towards the south the deve-
. lopment of Soviet influence in the Arabian 
p~ninsula and Africa is the second part of the 
pmcer movement closing on the Indian Ocean. 
The Arabian peninsula is threatened by a 
dynamic South Yemen, with the powerful assis-
tance of the Soviet Union, and by a Palestinian 
diaspora which may now be said to be threaten-
ing the stability of nearly all the states in the 
region. Although little is still known about the 
events in Mecca in autumn 1979, they indicate 
that the strength of dissenting forces has be-
come considerable, even in Saudi Arabia. 
There are numerous Palestinians and they hold 
key positions in. the Gulf oil states. They have 
their . political and military organisation and 
constitute a major threat to stability in the area. 
23. In Africa, the Soviet Union has found a 
series of staging posts, some in the north others 
in the centre or south of the continen't inter 
alia in Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, Guinea Benin 
Zambia and Mozambique. The presedce of ~ 
large Cuban contingent and a number of techni-
cians from East Germany allows these countries 
to be used as a base for bringing pressure and 
steady threats to bear on South Africa and for 
fomenting instability, unrest and dissent in most 
African countries. But South Africa alone 
accounts for 40 % of African industry and 45 % 
of its mining output, 86 % of world platinum 
output, 83% chromium, 14% vanadium, 49% 
gold, 48 % manganese and 46 % fluorine not to 
speak of the importance of the Cape r~ute for 
world trade since 78 % of Europe's oil supplies 
pass by that route, including 68 % of those of 
the Federal Republic and 99 % of those of 
France, plus 80% of Western Europe's imports 
of raw materials. . 
24. It is therefore impossible to isolate the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan from a 
whole series of other events occurring all round 
the Indian Ocean and which show a coherent 
attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to use 
this region in a global strategy. 
25. The present economic crisis in the West 
provides the Soviet Union with an excellent 
opportuni~y for developing this undertaking by 
strengthenmg all the elements of internal 
dissension in the " capitalist " countries. The 
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communist parties may play this role, but they 
do no.t hav.e a monopoly. The development of 
terronsm m Turkey and its continuation in 
Italy are alarming factors of destabilisation. 
The crisis also allows advantage to be taken of 
growing differences between the western coun-
tries' economic interests in order to break up 
the cohesion of the capitalist world. Commu-
nist party exploitation of national feelings in 
certam European countries and above all the 
spread of nationalist claims in the industrial 
trade and even agricultural fields indicate that 
this is a concerted operation designed to ruin 
the western alliance and weaken the ability of 
each western country to resist Soviet pressure 
and, furthermore, to annihilate the West's 
overall ability to resist this pressure by 
destroying its cohesion. 
26. Such an undertaking implies the use of 
propaganda as an essential means of separating 
th~ \Yest from the third world countries by assi-
milatmg the cause of the West's security to that 
of imperialism, colonialism and capitalism. 
This propaganda campaign of course finds 
many footholds in the third world and in the 
West and its effectiveness cannot be denied. 
The exploitation of feelings left over from past 
~istory, ~owever unjustified they may now be, 
IS a habitual method of destroying the West's 
cohesion. Anti-Americanism in Europe or 
anti-Germanism in certain countries are the 
themes of propaganda which has been pushed 
relentlessly ever since the end of the second 
world war. Moreover, the assimilation of 
Soviet policy to the interests of peace or even 
justice and freedom is a leitmotiv propagated by 
a large number of organisations, some of which 
directly or indirectly run by Moscow, such a~ 
the "Peace Movement", aim at weakening the 
western societies' will to resist. In this field 
too times of crisis favour the development of 
such propaganda. 
27. These various factors do not allow it to 
be concluded that the Soviet Union is preparing 
for a final assault on the capitalist world. It is 
far more likely that it is seeking a position of 
force from which to negotiate with the capitalist 
powers, whose inevitable decline can but be 
speeded up by the economic crisis, in order to 
work out, at least in the first stage, a sort of 
division of the world, of. influences and of 
wealth. Without taking any risks, of nuclear 
war at least, the Soviet Union would thus have 
gained a strong position for the subsequent sta-
ges of a necessary world revolution in face of 
which the West would be divided, weakened 
and demoralised, if not neutralised. Shifting 
from the class struggle to the foreign policy and 
diplomatic field also means proceeding with 
caution and moderation so as not to compro-
mise certain results by resorting to reckless 
policies. 
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28. This probably explains the moderation 
shown by the Soviet Union once it realised that 
~ts intervention in Afghanistan might jeopardise 
Its whole external policy, make it lose the 
advantages it had gained and create tension 
which could but isolate and weaken it. At the 
end of June 1980, just before the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council, the Soviet Union 
announcing the withdrawal of a few troop~ 
from Afghanistan after having told the world a 
few weeks earlier that it would apply the Brezh-
nev doctrine of limited sovereignty for socialist 
st~tes, showed that it did not intend to press on 
With the confrontation with the West which 
was determined to refuse the fait acco~pli and 
had the support of a large proportion of the 
non-aligned countries. It should be noted 
moreover that according to available informa-
tion the Soviet troops withdrawn from Afghan-
istan were immediately replaced and every-
thing indicates that the size of the forces enga-
ged in that country increased during the sum-
mer. 
29. It is with this in mind that the Soviet 
Union's military threat to the free world must 
be assessed: for the Soviet Union there is no 
truly military field separate from 'the political 
field, the military being placed at the service of 
a highly political cause, particularly since poli-
tical action itself is thought out as strategy. 
2. Military aspects 
(a) Armaments 
30. Sl!ch a policy could not in fact be pur-
sued Without the Soviet Union building up 
military strength which on the one hand ensu-
res the. country's security and, on the other, 
~llows It to protect its operations against any 
mtervention by the capitalist powers and fur-
nishes a means of acting against and bringing 
pressure to bear on countries where it wants its 
will to prevap. This explains why, since the 
1917 revolutiOn, the Soviet Union has been 
making a steady armaments effort. Since 1945 
its aim has been to ensure that it has over~ 
whelming military superiority over absolutely 
any adversary in every field. Since that date it 
has. regularly assigned 11 to 15 % of its gr~ss 
natiOnal product to defence as compared with a 
current figure of less than 6% for the United 
States and 3 to 4% for most European mem-
bers of the Atlantic Alliance in the last five 
years. In 1979, NATO decided on an increase 
of 3 % at constant values in the military bud-
gets of member states. But it will take about 
ten years for thi~ decision, if effectively and 
contmuously apphed, to produce an increase of 
eve!l one per cent ~n the proportion of gross 
natiOnal product assigned to defence since it is 
only about to;oo of the GNP. This constant 
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imbalance in military expenditure between the 
two sides explains why, for the past few years 
the S<?viet Union has been on the way t~ 
becommg the world's leading military power, 
although NATO still considers it can to a cer-
tain extent make up for its quantitative inferio-
rity by its more advanced technology. 
31. (z) Where strategic nuclear forces are 
concerned, the SALT II agreements, signed in 
1979 but whose ratification by the U_nited 
States Senate was postponed sine die after the 
invasion of Afghanistan, reflected the real 
balance of forces by acknowledging that the 
Soviet Union can claim definite superiority as 
regards the number of delivery vehicles. In 
view of the characteristics of the means of deli-
very, the number of MIRVed warheads on each 
side, the number of nuclear submarines 
deployed and the total number of strategic 
n_uc!ear weapons available, this numerical supe-
nonty does not seem to give the Soviet Union 
decisive superiority over the United States. 
Neverthetess, it must be noted that the Soviet 
Union has, to say the least, achieved parity in 
such weapons. 
32. (il) For long-range theatre nuclear wea-
pons the situation is quite different. Since 
1978, the Soviet Union has been deploying a 
new generation of multi-warhead missiles the 
SS-20, particularly on the European side, ~hich 
al~ead~ ensure overwhelming superiority and 
th1s Will be the case for some time to come. 
Thes~ weapons are capable of attaining with 
extreme accuracy any target whatsoever on the 
territory of Western Europe and are thus very 
largely capable of disarming NATO forces 
without the latter being able to retaliate with 
we~pons of an equivalent type. It is currently 
estimated that there are 450 Soviet SS-4 and 
SS-5 missiles and 180 SS-20 missiles (each with 
three nuclear warheads making a total of 540 
nuclear warheads) deployed in Europe. To 
these should be added the long-range nuclear 
weapon-carrying bombers known in the West as 
the " Backfire " bombers. SS-20 missiles are 
being deployed at a rate of more than one a 
week, whi~h means ~hat if the West keeps 
exactly to Its present time-table, in 1983, when 
the first western long-range theatre nuclear wea-
pons are deployed, the Soviet Union will 
already have deployed about 400 SS-20 missi-
les. In these circumstances, for a long time to 
come the Soviet Union will be able in the 
event of hostilities, to choose the ievel of 
operations and hence dissociate the interests of 
the United States, which are above all to avoid 
using strategic nuclear weapons from those of 
Europe which has as much to f~ar from SS-20s 
as from strategic missiles. 
33. (iiz) In conventional weapons, the Soviet 
Union and its allies have long had considerable 
numerical superiority in troops, aircraft and 
tanks and now the same is true for the quality 
of their equipment since the Soviet Union, for 
instance, has already introduced a third genera-
tion of aircraft since the second world war 
whereas NATO is still at the second generation. 
In spite of the larger number of weapons 
deployed by the Soviet Union, the West for 
many years considered that its superior techno-
logy allowed it to have more perfected, reliable 
and effective weapons systems, thus offsetting 
its quantitative inferiority. However, large-
scale investments by the Soviet Union in its 
armaments industry and the systematic guidance 
of its best scientists, engineers and managers 
mean, according to all available information, 
that it has now achieved qualitative parity, thus 
depriving the West of its last remaining advan-
tage. With a long period of military service, 
some 27,000 combat tanks in Europe compared 
with 11,000 for NATO, very powerful artillery 
and a numerous and modern air force (5,800 
tactical aircraft for the Warsaw Pact in Europe 
compared with 3,300 for NATO), the Soviet 
Union is almost certain of being able to beat 
NATO forces in the event of generalised hosti-
lities which remain below the nuclear thres-
hold. The Soviet Union is therefore able to 
force NATO into the difficult position of 
having to be the first to use nuclear weapons, 
which may obviously raise doubts about the 
western deterrent, i.e. about the determination 
of the NATO countries to resist Soviet pres-
sure. 
34. It can thus be seen that Leonid Brezh-
nev's promise to the Czechoslovak Communist 
Party in Prague in February 1977 is gradually 
coming true: "In 1985, we shall have attained 
most of our objectives in Western Europe and 
the reversal of forces will then be so decisive 
that we shall be in a position to impose our will 
each time this is necessary". 
35. (iv) In the naval field, the Soviet Union 
has made a major effort in the last ten years 
and it now has a nuclear or conventional capa-
bility of intervening anywhere in the world. 
Admittedly, it has fewer and smaller aircraft-
carriers than the United States and its allies but 
the presence of Soviet aircraft-carriers in the 
Indian Ocean is a means of bolstering Soviet 
political and military influence there. The 
entire Soviet surface fleet numbers 132 vessels 
compared to 196 for the United States but its 
naval tonnage exceeds that of the United States 
and, in view of the United States' need to 
defend long lines of communication, this 
ensures the Soviet Union clear superiority. 
36. It has 305 submarines of which 87 have a 
missile-launching capability, 83 are nuclear-
propelled attack submarines and 135 conven-
tionally-propelled attack submarines, compared 
with 41 strategic submarines, 70 nuclear-
propelled attack submarines and 8 convention-
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ally-propelled submarines for the United Sta-
tes plus 9, 11 and 49 submarines of the three 
categories for the European Community coun-
tries. The Soviet Union is therefore ahead of 
the West and can intervene in force along the 
lines of communication between Europe and 
the United States. Thus, following recent 
naval manreuvres, the Soviet commander-in-
chief announced triumphantly in a wireless 
message, not in code, that he was in a position 
to cut the links between Western Europe and 
the United States for five days in the event of 
hostilities. 
(b) Strategic positions 
37. The Soviet Union is therefore becoming 
the world's leading military power and its 
qualitative and quantitative lead is growing 
steadily. Its power is further strengthened by the 
strategic positions threatening the West's secu-
rity that it has gained since the second world 
war and which enhance the value of its arma-
ments. 
38. (i) In Europe itself, from the North Cape 
to the Black Sea, it is deploying nuclear-
warhead missiles capable of destroying in a few 
minutes the principal towns or a large number 
of military installations in all the Western 
European countries and thus practically annihi-
lating the forces deployed by NATO. The 
stationing of the Soviet army in Czechoslovakia 
in 1968 placed it at the very centre of Europe 
and, even with conventional forces, it can 
threaten the principal route between Northern 
and Southern Europe. 
39. (iz) In Asia and Africa, the Soviet Union 
now has a large number of bases which allow it 
to maintain a vast fleet in the Indian Ocean and 
supply any of its allies with weapons and 
equipment at very short notice. If it is borne 
in mind that, for the Soviet Union, the distance 
from its frontiers or coasts to the oil-producing 
areas of the Persian Gulf varies from I ,400 to 
2,400 km by air and is 2,800 km by sea (to 
Syria), whereas for the United States the dis-
tance varies from 6,000 to 7,000 km in the first 
case and from I 0,000 to 15,000 km in the 
second, that the Soviet Union has I5 airborne 
divisions which can be brought into the area, 2 
of them within 5 days, whereas the United Sta-
tes has to allow about I8 days to bring 2 divi-
sions into the Gulf, and that the occupation of 
Afghanistan has further improved the Soviet 
transport capability, the magnitude of the 
Soviet Union's ability to intervene can be seen. 
Control of Aden and the coast of Ethiopia 
further increases its superiority and extends its 
reach to a large part of the African continent. 
40. Conversely, countries wishing to rely on 
the West for their security, whether in Asia or 
in Africa, are now threatened. In particular, 
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this is so for Pakistan, shut in between a hostile 
India and Afghanistan which .is occupied by the 
Red Army, Thailand, now under direct attack 
by Vietnamese forces armed and assisted by the 
Soviet Union, and South Africa, isolated by 
Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique which are 
also to varying degrees armed, assisted or advi-
sed by the Soviet Union. 
(c) Soviet aims 
41. This incredible military deployment is 
not necessarily destined to make an all-out 
assault on the free world, in the immediate 
future at least, but rather to weaken the West 
materially and place it at the mercy of Soviet 
good will for supplies of oil and raw materials 
needed for its economy and to induce the west-
em countries to seek security by coming to 
direct terms with the Soviet Union because they 
no longer have confidence in the effectiveness 
of the Atlantic Alliance. The Soviet Union 
has already announced that it could guarantee 
Western Europe's oil supplies, which is the 
same as saying that it could also deny them. 
In this way, the Soviet Union would assume an 
overwhelming influence over the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance and would 
deprive NATO of its substance by gaining 
control over the economic survival and military 
capability of these countries. 
42. In the event of war, the Soviet Union 
would be able to choose the level of hostilities 
and consequently place the enemy before the 
choice between escalation, thus assuming res-
ponsibility for and risk of destruction, or 
bowing to Soviet demands. Thus, the ultimate 
aim of all these military means designed to un-
dermine the Atlantic Alliance and to disrupt 
NATO is to isolate the Western European 
countries in face of Soviet pressure and to give 
full effect to the political means used to ensure 
Soviet preponderance in the world. 
43. Admittedly, in recent years the Soviet 
Union's intentions have seemed peaceful. It 
has taken major steps in the limitation of 
nuclear weapons and in security and co-
operation in Europe, it has given up its claims 
to control West Berlin and has taken part in the 
MBFR negotiations and the Geneva Disarma-
ment Committee. But for it to continue along 
this course the Atlantic Alliance must remain 
strong: the stronger it is, the longer the Soviet 
Union's peaceful intentions will last. 
44. But since 1970 the Soviet Union's mili-
tary potential has become strong enough for it 
to enjoy the full spectrum of political and 
military options and it can henceforth under-
_take anything anywhere at any time. All in 
all, this potential will be a far greater danger-fo _ 
the West than any intentions that, rightly or 
wrongly, may be attributed to it. 
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III. The requirements of western security 
45. Faced with such a many-sided threat 
covering so vast an area, the West's security 
depends on unyielding cohesion. No state, 
probably not even the United States, can think 
of taking on the Soviet challenge alone. 
1. Military solidarity 
46. In the military field, only the United Sta-
tes, thanks to its own nuclear potential, is able 
to provide a credible deterrent to Soviet strate-
gic weapons. This is beyond the ability of 
even the European powers that have nuclear 
weapons and for Europe there is no alternative 
to the NATO guarantee that the American 
deterrent will work. NATO ensures the pre-
sence of American conventional and nuclear 
forces on European soil and hence that any 
attack on Western Europe will meet United 
States and Canadian forces and, consequently, 
the whole spectrum of American strength, 
including its strategic nuclear weapons. 
4 7. When General de Gaulle worked out and 
described the basic strategy for the French 
nuclear force, he made it clear that France did 
not intend to leave the Atlantic Alliance and 
that its strategy had a place only in relation to 
the strength of American deterrence and in the 
framework of a policy of collective defence 
which gave the national character of the French 
strike force its full value: insufficient on its own 
to deter Soviet aggression, it sought to give 
France, a European power, a means of trans-
forming any conflict whatsoever into nuclear 
war and therefore gave Europe a new element 
of deterrence and hence of security. 
48. The very concept of the British nuclear 
force is closely linked with that of the United 
States, and it is placed under NATO integrated 
military command in peacetime, subject to the 
right to withdraw it in the event of the United 
Kingdom's vital interests being at stake. There 
is therefore no question of the United King-
dom's defence being separated from that of the 
Alliance as a whole. A fortiori, the defence 
policy of all the other European countries 
depends on the integrated defence system which 
guarantees the umbrella of American strategic 
weapons as well as the reinforcement of United 
States theatre nuclear weapons on the continent 
of Europe. 
49. In these conditions, anything that may 
weaken the links between Western Europe and 
the United States and Canada is a serious dan-
ger for the security of all and especially of the 
European members of the Alliance. The 
Soviet Union is aware of this and, in peacetime, 
deploys every political means available to stir 
up differences between the members of the 
Atlantic Alliance and, in wartime, its strategy 
would be first and foremost to break the links 
between Europe and the United States and 
Canada. Hence, any indication of Europe 
moving away from its North American partners 
in the Atlantic Alliance would be a serious 
threat to the security of Europe. There is a 
risk of any call for Europe to become indepen-
dent of the United States and Canada leading to 
a break-up of NATO, thus destroying the secu-
rity of the western world and above all of the 
part of Europe which has remained free. 
2. Political solidarity 
50. This obviously does not mean that Eur-
ope has no right to criticise the United States, 
but in its own interests its criticism must not be 
overdone and Europeans must not lose faith in 
American policy nor, above all, in the determi-
nation of the United States to defend Europe in 
the event of attack. Any signs of this might 
well induce the United States and Canada to 
react negatively towards Europe as happened to 
some extent in the early months of 1980, when 
American ·public opinion felt that Europe was 
not giving President Carter its full support in 
the dispute with Iran and in his strong com-
plaints about the invasion of Afghanistan. 
Any increase or prolongation of such reactions 
from American public opinion would inevitably 
leave room for doubts about the United States' 
determination to use all the means at its dispo-
sal to ensure the defence of Western Europe 
and would consequently make a de facto divi-
sion between Europe and the United States and 
therefore weaken the European defence system. 
51. Moreover, if the two groups of partners 
in the Atlantic Alliance were thus to drift apart, 
it might induce certain European states to try to 
ensure their own security by means which 
would quickly break up the Alliance and wea-
ken collective security. This would be the case 
in particular if some sought, through direct and 
isolated closer contacts with the Soviet Union, 
the illusory guarantee of their own security at 
the expense of that of the European continent 
as a whole. Together, these two effects would 
be a real triumph for Soviet strategy since they 
would allow the Soviet Union to attain one of 
its principal goals without even having to resort 
to force. It is therefore evident that such 
attacks, aimed at destroying the solidarity of the 
Atlantic Alliance, are part of the Soviet Union's 
political and strategic calculations and that 
Europe must be careful not to heed them. 
52. To be effective, the Atlantic Alliance's 
defence policy must be based on a realistic view 
of the threats to the West and take account 
inter alia of the fact that detente is possible 
only if the Warsaw Pact powers, which are the 
other side of the world balance with the Atlan-
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tic Alliance, are absolutely convinced that they 
must take the free world, its determination and 
strength seriously. This means that to ensure 
its security the West must be united and deter-
mined to remain so, it must be well-enough 
armed to meet any threat effectively and res-
pond to any attack and it must be resolutely 
determined to defend itself. 
3. Flexible response 
53. None of the experts, whether in universi-
ties or in the armed forces, any longer denies 
the fact that the Warsaw Pact has far more 
armaments than are needed for a defensive stra-
tegy and a military policy based merely on the 
defence of its positions. Its armed forces are 
organised and deployed in terms of an offensive 
policy, nota defensive one. 
54. In view of its situation, Europe cannot 
consider a strategy of confrontation with the 
Soviet Union and must consequently base its 
security on deterrence alone, which does not 
mean, in the present state of the balance of for-
ces, that only nuclear forces play a part. For 
deterrence to be fully effective, it is in fact 
essential that the timing and nature of the 
West's retaliation to any aggression should be 
and remain uncertain and incalculable for the 
Soviet leaders. For instance, they must not be 
sure of being able to conduct aggression at a 
level fixed by them beforehand and they must 
have to reckon on American nuclear retaliation 
before Western Europe has been invaded. This 
element of deterrence is essential if the Soviet 
Union is to be prevented from relying on its 
conventional superiority in order to envisage 
winning a war by keeping it at conventional 
level and convinced that the risk it would take 
by attacking would be impossible to calculate 
beforehand. The same is true of its superio-
rity in medium-range nuclear weapons as long 
as the American decision to station 600 Per-
shing II and cruise missiles in Europe (i.e. with 
three warheads per missile, a total of 1 ,800 
nuclear warheads) has not been implemented. 
55. The doctrine of flexible response is there-
fore the only one which meets the needs of 
Western European security. It means that at 
every level NATO must have means of beating 
Soviet aggression and, short of this, it must be 
able to escalate the fighting to a higher level 
without immediately launching an exchange of 
strategic nuclear weapons between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. NATO forces 
must be deployed so as to convince Soviet mili-
tary planners that there could be no certainty 
or even serious hope of conducting the fighting 
on their own terms. 
56. The effectiveness of the flexible response 
therefore depends on the Alliance being in . 
DOCUMENT 854 
strong enough shape to assure observers that 
Europeans and Americans are determined to 
defend Europe and that they have the means of 
doing so, i.e. that they have sufficient forces, 
equipped with weapons of all kinds, to make 
credible any threat on their part to resort to 
escalation to counter possible attacks. This 
has military implications - not to allow the 
Soviet Union to have a weapon against which 
the West has no means of retaliating, as tends 
to be the case at present for long-range theatre 
weapons - and ·political implications - the 
cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. 
4. Requirements of a policy of deterrence 
57. A long history of international relations 
has shown in fact that it is often for lack of 
internal cohesion rather than because of attacks 
from without that alliances fail to work in that 
either they no longer manage to avoid war or 
they break apart - sometimes during the wars 
they have not been able to avoid. Thucydides 
already gave a masterly demonstration of this in 
relation to the Athens maritime confederation, 
and the history of Europe in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries provides many other 
examples. 
58. The unity and solidarity of the western 
community have already proved their effective-
ness. Thus, the West's vital interests have not 
been defied or called in question whenever the 
West has clearly demonstrated that it was uni-
ted in its determination to defend them. A 
first instance was the attempt to blockade Ber-
lin in 1948, when the United States found the 
appropriate response and showed that any fur-
ther escalation of the Soviet operation would 
run up against American military might. 
59. This determination and the maintenance 
of a balance of force in Europe in spite of the 
gigantic military effort made by the Soviet 
Union over the years led to the emergence of 
detente and its progressive development 
through increased trade, meetings, conferences 
and negotiations on the limitation of nuclear 
weapons, the reduction of conventional forces 
and security and co-operation in Europe since 
this process called for mutual confidence which 
could not find a guarantee in the Soviet 
Union's need to respect force. Thus, far from 
being an obstacle to detente, as communist 
propaganda has been trying to show for more 
than a quarter of a century, the West's strength 
and solidarity are a condition of detente and, 
more than any other factor, they have preven-
ted any attack on the territories guaranteed by 
the Atlantic Alliance ever since its formation. 
60. There is no reason to doubt the future of 
this cohesion, whatever might have been said or 
thought in recent years. France's withdrawal 
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from the NATO integrated military organisa-
tion may have opened the door for such specu-
lation, but General de Gaulle and his successors 
have never called in question France's determi-
nation to stand by its undertakings under the 
North Atlantic Treaty and the modified Brus-
sels Treaty. All that is known about the trend 
of its defence policy and its foreign policy, its 
nuclear effort and the deployment of its forces 
totally negates the idea that it might be a weak 
link in the defence system of the Alliance. 
61. Your Rapporteur believes there is no 
question of making an indirect attempt to bring 
France back into the NATO integrated com-
mands. As then Federal Minister of Defence, 
your Rapporteur deplored France's withdrawal 
from NATO. But this is now a fact and 
-France's -decision must be respected: the defence 
of Europe must be based on the idea that France 
will -not return to NATO in the foreseeable 
future but will in no way call in question its 
membership of the Atlantic Alliance. This 
seems to be a basis of understanding between 
France and its partners, particularly as political 
circles in all the countries of the Alliance fully 
realise that there can be no European defence 
policy without the United States and France. 
Similarly, discussions in France about defence 
show that that country too considers there can 
be no defence without the participation of the 
United States. Outside NATO, France plays a 
special role and, because it feels responsible for 
Europe's security, it is a particularly strong ele-
ment of the European pillar of the Alljance. 
In his speech at the Institut des Hautes Etudes 
de Defense Nationale on lith September 1980, 
Mr. Barre left no doubt about this role, under-
lining the priority France gave to deterrence, its 
determination to have the most effective wea-
pons and its concern not to dissociate its secu-
rity from that of its neighbours. 
62. Similarly, the unswerving determination 
of all members of the Alliance in face of 
approaches or pressure by the Warsaw Pact 
countries to make them go back on their under-
takings in the Atlantic community is most pro-
mising for the future. For thirty years, there 
has been no rift in the solidarity of the Atlantic 
community for the defence of the freedom of all 
its members, nor has any member tried to avoid 
its commitments. 
63. It is precisely this remarkable success of 
the Alliance that now raises the question of 
its adaptation to take account of the changes 
that have occurred both inside and outside the 
Atlantic community and of the evolution of the 
threats it is designed to meet so that it may 
continue to play its full role in the interest of 
the security of all its members and of peace and 
the pursuit of detente. 
64. Here, it is the joint management of the 
Alliance that ensures that efforts made by each 
member country have a maximum effect for the 
benefit of the security of all. 
IV. The European pillar of the Alliance 
1. Europe's place in the Alliance 
65. The West's security cannot be guaranteed 
unless account is taken of the nature of the 
political aims of the Soviet Union, the strength 
of the Warsaw Pact forces deployed against 
Western Europe and the close link between the 
development of detente and the maintenance of 
security. There can be no question of any 
member of the Atlantic community conducting 
its policy in the light of just one of the joint 
aims and, in particular, the idea that the North 
American members of the Alliance might spe-
cialise in defence and the European members 
might play the role of detente would have disas-
trous consequences and destroy the solidarity 
on which deterrence is based. Everyone's secu-
rity depends closely on the policy of common 
defence and the development of detente. 
66. This means that the Alliance must, so to 
speak, be jointly managed by all its members so 
that, on the one hand, each one's efforts pro-
duce the maximum results for joint security 
and, on the other hand, no rift J!lay form bet-
ween the members in questions of defence pol-
icy or in their relations with the Warsaw Pact 
countries. 
67. One way or another, strengthening 
NATO means strengthening its European ele-
ment. Changing circumstances and growing 
threats to world peace and the obligations they 
impose on the American partners of the Alli-
ance, particularly in areas not covered by the 
North Atlantic Treaty and especially in the 
Middle East, call for a special effort by Eur-
ope. Europeans must in fact be able, should 
the need arise, to take over from any American 
forces temporarily withdrawn from Europe for 
deployment in another part of the world so that 
the security guaranteed by the NATO military 
system is not jeopardised. It remains that the 
deterrent value of the Alliance is largely based 
on the physical presence of American forces in 
Europe, particularly in the Federal Republic, 
where no European forces can reasonably 
replace them. 
68. But apart from this particular problem, 
the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance cannot be 
truly ensured unless there is some degree of 
balance between its European and American 
components. This was the idea advanced by 
President Kennedy in his speech at Philadel-
phia on 4th July 1962 when he referred to the 
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organisation of an Atlantic community based 
on two pillars. This concept is still just as 
topical, even though it is taking longer to 
implement than John Kennedy thought. 
2. The European components of the Alliance 
69. The present growth of the European 
Communities is the first sign of this European 
pillar as it creates a community of interests bet-
ween the various Western European states. 
However, this community of interests does not 
always mean community of views on defence 
matters and a number of measures may be envi-
saged in order to strengthen the cohesion of the 
European pillar of the Alliance in the near 
future. 
70. For instance, Greece should be encou-
raged to resume its place in NATO without 
delay. Its differences with Turkey are not 
sufficient reason for Greece to sever ties with its 
allies, particularly as it has no true deterrent of 
its own. 
71. At the NATO ministerial meeting in 
Ankara in June 1980, Mr. Muskie, United 
States Secretary of State, held separate talks 
with the Greek and Turkish Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs and subsequently said there 
were quite good prospects of Greece returning 
to the organisation which it had left after the 
Cyprus affair in 1974. The Greek Government 
for its part agreed that priority should be given 
to returning to NATO in connection with a 
bilateral Greek-American agreement on Ame-
rican military bases in Greece. In other 
words, Greece seems convinced that joining 
the EEC and returning to NATO are two 
parallel steps, the aim being for Greece to play 
a full part in both. 
72. In the case of Spain, its accession to the 
Atlantic Alliance has become a necessity and 
the Spanish authorities seem to be aware of 
this, as recalled by President Carter on 25th 
June 1980 when he was visiting Madrid. 
Spain is linked to the United States by a treaty 
of mutual assistance which expires in 1981 and 
grants the United States one naval base and 
three air bases on Spanish territory in exchange 
for economic and military assistance amounting 
to $ 1,250 million but the United States and the 
Spanish Government have apparently agreed 
to replace this bilateral treaty by Spain's acces-
sion to NATO: Mr. Ouja, Spanish Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, has announced that his country 
would apply for accession in 1981 and might 
become a member in 1983. However, Mr. 
Ouja asked for two guarantees: 
(z) that the process of integrating Spain 
into the EEC would be continued 
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because of the interdependence bet-
ween the economic and military inte-
gration of Spain in Western Europe; 
(il) that the Spanish-British negotiations 
on transferring the sovereignty of 
Gibraltar to Spain be well under way, 
preliminary negotiations having 
already begun between the United 
Kingdom and Spain. 
73. Apart from a 200,000-strong army, a 
48,000-strong navy and a 40,000-strong air force, 
Spain would bring the Alliance a highly 
valuable strategic position both on the Mediter-
ranean and on the Atlantic, thanks to the Can-
ary Islands. 
74. Conversely, it might be in the joint inte-
rest of the Europeans to link the accession of 
Spain to NATO with membership of the Euro-
pean Economic Community. Its accession to 
NATO might be examined at the same time as 
its admission to the EEC. In fact, just as Spain 
does not intend to join NATO without being 
admitted to the EEC, and for the same reasons, 
its partners may link its admission to the EEC 
with membership of NATO. Moreover, there 
is every indication that the Spanish socialists, 
who were for a long time hostile to Spain's par-
ticipation in the Atlantic Alliance, will no lon-
ger refuse to have Spain take its place in the 
West's collective defence system in Europe. 
As a condition, they wish the Spanish people to 
be consulted by referendum. Nor would any-
thing prevent the three countries which have 
applied for membership of the European Com-
munity being encouraged to accede at the same 
time to the modified Brussels Treaty and WEU, 
thus giving an institutional framework to the 
European pillar of the Alliance. Finally, a 
solution should be found whereby Ireland, in 
view of its special situation, might be associated 
in one way or another with its European part-
ners in the defence field. 
7 5. Broader foundations might naturally be 
envisaged for the European pillar, particularly 
since Norway and Turkey are members of 
NATO and the Mediterranean is still Europe's 
mare nostrum, providing access to its vital cen-
tres whose control is essential for its security, 
and the Norwegian Sea is a route between 
Europe and North America, inter alia for 
Soviet submarines. 
76. As a result of a referendum, Norway refu-
sed to join the EEC. The distances separating 
its most exposed territories - the Great North 
and the islands in the Barents Sea - from the 
central sector of European defence are so great 
that Norway is hesitant about its defence being 
too closely associated with that of the Central 
Europe sector and hopes for a special contribu-
tion to its defence from the United States and 
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Canada. In these circumstances, an attempt 
should be made to find a special solution to the 
problem of its participation in the European 
pillar of the Atlantic community. 
77. This also applies to Turkey, whose rela-
tionship with the EEC will have to be deter-
mined in the next few years and whose position 
at the heart of the Middle East and on the 
frontiers of the Soviet Union raises particular 
problems. 
78 .. The fact that the means of all the Euro-
pean members of the Atlantic Alliance are not 
identical in no way weakens the cohesion of the 
European pillar of the Alliance. On the 
contrary, the British and French nuclear forces 
can, and in fact do, make a major contribution 
to collective security. In recent years, the Uni-
ted Kingdom has been wondering whether to 
modernise its nuclear force by adopting a new 
generation of means of delivery. It has decided 
to make the necessary financial sacrifices to 
modernise its nuclear force and has thus com-
mitted itself to a long-term defence policy in 
which nuclear weapons will play an essential 
role. 
79. France for its part is in the process of 
modernising its strike force. It is replacing the 
missiles on the Plateau d'Albion by more 
powerful and more accurate means. It has 
just decided to build a sixth nuclear submarine 
and on 27th June 1980 President Giscard d'Es-
taing announced that research had been carried 
out since 197 6 for developing enhanced radia-
tion weapons and missiles with mobile laun-
chers. The French neutron weapon should be 
ready for deployment in 1983. 
80. The existence and modernisation of the 
British and French nuclear forces considerably 
strengthens the Alliance's deterrent capability 
and more effectively than could be done by a 
European nuclear force which has often been 
mentioned but never seriously envisaged by the 
governments of any of the countries capable of 
playing a major role in its formation. The 
United Kingdom has never responded to 
approaches about the development of Franco-
British nuclear weaponry. At the very time he 
was setting up the French strike force, General 
de Gaulle announced that he intended this 
force to remain under the sole responsibility of 
the French head of state. The idea of Franco-
German nuclear co-operation has never been 
part of the French Government's policy nor 
that of the Federal German Government. 
81. Indeed, the Federal Republic has always 
considered that it would derive no advantage 
from the possession of nuclear weapons and to 
have them would involve a strong risk of spe-
cial difficulties in its relations with the Eastern 
European countries. Moreover, it fears that 
the production of a European nuclear weapon 
might provide a reason or pretext for reducing 
the American presence in Europe. 
82. This does not mean that the Federal 
Republic, any more than its European partners, 
is against the existence and development of the 
French and British nuclear forces. It therefore 
considers, as the North Atlantic Council for-
mally declared in Ottawa in June 1974, that the 
French and British nuclear forces make a most 
useful contribution to the joint defence of the 
West on the one hand because of the weapons 
themselves and on the other - and above all -
because they help to make it even more diffi-
cult for the Soviet Union to calculate the nature 
of the response to be expected in the event of 
attack. 
3. Europe's armaments 
83. Further, NATO, and particularly its 
European component, must make a major effort 
to make up for the time it has lost in the last 
ten years in the power and modernisation of its 
armaments, both nuclear and conventional. In 
the nuclear field, which mainly concerns the 
Americans, this implies inter alia the introduc-
tion of new weapons in response to the long-
range theatre nuclear weapons deployed by the 
Soviet Union, particularly the SS-20s. These 
weapons are Pershing II and cruise missiles. It 
is surprising how slow the European members 
of NATO are to agree to the deployment of 
these weapons, which are essential for Europe's 
security, on their territory. At present, the 
Federal Republic and the United Kingdom are 
known to have accepted the principle and in 
June 1980 the British Government even indi-
cated the sites it was reserving for cruise mis-
siles on its territory. Italy has also agreed to 
the deployment of cruise missiles on its terri-
tory. Belgium has again postponed taking a 
decision, and there has been no positive sign 
from the Netherlands. Europe therefore bears 
heavy responsibility in the delays accumulated 
by the Alliance in the sector of long-range 
theatre weapons. 
84. However, it should be noted tha:t it will 
not be possible to start deploying the Pershing 
II before 1983 and that, in view of the present 
rate at which the SS-20s are being introduced, 
the Soviet Union will still have a considerable 
lead in theatre weapons for a long time to 
come. 
85. Moreover, in view of the overwhelming 
tank superiority of the Soviet Union and its 
allies it seems essential for NATO to introduce 
as soon as possible a weapon capable of pre-
venting the Soviet Union taking advantage of 
this superiority, i.e. enhanced radiation missiles, 
commonly known as neutron shells. It is well 
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known that for several years the Soviet Union 
and the communist parties have been conduct-
ing a vast propaganda campaign to induce the 
West to renounce this weapon for the very rea-
son that they consider it to be effective. It 
would be most dangerous for the West to pay 
heed to such propaganda and further delay the 
development of this weapon. The French 
Government for its part seems to have under-
stood this. 
86. In fact, the Alliance as such has already 
taken its decision. In 1965, when Federal 
Minister of Defence, your Rapporteur had an 
opportunity of discussing with his then United 
States counterpart, Mr. McNamara, the need to 
increase the credibility of the Alliance's deter-
rent capability by developing an extremely 
accurate and highly mobile nuclear weapon 
with a very limited target area- about a square 
kilometre -and little fallout so as to cause only 
a minimum of radioactive pollution over a 
small area and for a short time in order to meet 
the chalJenge of Soviet conventional armaments 
- and particularly its tank superiority -
without jeopardising the survival of a civilian 
population far from the battlefield. Such limi-
tation of its effects should make the use of such 
a weapon credible and make it an effective 
instrument of deterrence. This weapon, which 
is merely a piece of artillery, is now being deve-
loped and meets the Alliance's requirements in 
the framework of a defensive strategy based on 
deterrence. 
87. The deployment of new conventional 
weapons mainly concerns Western Europe. 
This is essential since Europe has fallen 
well behind the Soviet Union, particularly 
where aircraft are concerned. Thus, NATO 
forces must now be equipped with anti-tank 
and anti-aircraft missiles with conventional 
warheads to prevent the Soviet Union taking 
advantage of its superiority in these two areas. 
88. This effort is quite clearly in Europe's 
interest since it must prevent the United States 
being faced with a choice between nuclear war 
involving the use of strategic nuclear weapons 
and abandoning Europe. Only if Europe has 
the means and determination to defend itself 
effectively will the United States find itself 
really committed to apply the strategy of flex-
ible response. A passive or cowardly attitude 
on the part of the Europeans can but spark off 
isolationist reactions in the United States and 
consequently aggressive reactions in the Soviet 
Union. 
4. European armaments policy 
89. This would mean the European members 
of NATO calling up troops who would have to 
be armed and equipped at very :short notice: 
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This has implications in many fields, including 
that of armaments. The symposium organised 
by the WEU Assembly in Brussels in 
October 1979 showed - if it was not already 
evident - how incoherent the armaments 
policies .of the European states are and how 
intolerable such a position is becoming. In 
spite of an agreement of principle on the need 
for interoperability of equipment of the 
various armies deployed in Europe, progress in 
this field has been insignificant and the forces 
having to take part in a common system on the 
same territory may well not be capable of 
operating because every country clings jealously 
to national concepts based more on traditions 
and peculiarities of military headquarters than 
on necessities. 
90. It is essential for NATO to ensure 
without delay that all the forces that might 
have to operate on the Central European front 
can stock up in the armouries of any national 
army and that a maximum of interoperability is 
achieved as soon as possible. In Central 
Europe, there is no longer any national defence 
or any particular theatre of operations. In the 
event of war, any commander-in-chief must be 
able to call on contingents from any other 
country to meet the urgent requirements he has 
to handle. 
91. The absence of standardisation and a 
fortiori inadequate joint production of arma-
ments lead to competition in weapons produc-
tion by European manufacturers with ruinous 
repercussions on military budgets and, hence, 
European taxpayers. Unit production costs are 
too high, making users prefer, in many cases, to 
procure the armaments they require outside 
Europe, which further increases the waste of 
public money and prevents the best use being 
made. of the already inadequate credits ear-
marked for defence equipment by the European 
countries. 
92. Since WEU started, its member countries, 
through the Standing Armaments Committee, 
have been defining European defence equip-
ment requirements and types of armaments 
corresponding to these requirements so as to 
unify the European armaments market as far as 
possible. It has to be recorded that the SAC 
has so far managed to achieve only very limited 
results with considerable loss of time. Even its 
study of the situation in the European 
armaments industries is advancing at the speed 
of a tortoise, not by fault of the international 
secretariat of the SAC which has zealously tried 
to pursue its study but rather of the govern-
ments which have been very parsimonious in 
providing the necessary elements of information 
and above all have shown no interest in a task 
which they themselves decided should be 
undertaken. It may be wondered whether the 
vast amount of work already done is not des-
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tined to lie dormant in the drawers of national 
administrations without their doing anything to 
draw the consequences in the field of joint 
production. 
93. Further, the European members of the 
Atlantic Alliance organised the Independent 
European Programme Group, also intended to 
promote co-operation between military head-
quarters and the appropriate departments of 
Defence Ministries with a view to promoting 
the joint production of armaments. Although 
its sub-groups have proliferated, this group has 
in turn met the same difficulties resulting from 
an absence of will to succeed on the part of 
national departments which intend to remain 
de facto masters in their areas of responsibility. 
94. Finally, it is on a bi- or trilateral basis 
that a number of weapons, including a few 
surface ships, aircraft and missiles, and even, 
more· recently, tanks have been produced on a 
joint basis. But the standardisation of Euro-
pean armaments is essential and will become 
increasingly so, and the European Community 
will no longer be able to dissociate itself from 
this matter, as Mr. Davignon, member of the 
Commission, underlined at the Brussels 
symposium. 
95. However, since the European countries' 
forces are solely or almost solely intended for 
deployment in a European theatre of opera-
tions, unlike American forces which may have 
to intervene in any part of the world, there is 
no technical reason why European armaments 
should not be unified. The only explanation 
for these difficulties and delays is the rigid atti-
tude of military headquarters and of the rele-
vant technical services or the special interests of 
armaments-producing firms and the pressure 
they are able to bring to bear on states. Simi-
larly, the lack of determination on the part of 
governments to overcome these obstacles leads 
to incredible delays both in interoperability and 
in joint production or standardisation of arma-
ments in Europe. 
5. Inter-allied consultations 
96. Finally, all these necessary arrangements 
require increased consultations between the 
American and European partners of the Alli-
ance in the framework of NATO without it 
being necessary to extend the defence area 
defined in the North Atlantic Treaty or to offer 
Europe's military support for an American 
policy aimed at curbing Soviet expansion in Asia 
and Africa This policy was expressed inter alia 
in the " Carter doctrine ", announced after the 
invasion of Afghanistan, according to which 
any further steps by the Soviet Union to attain 
its objectives would be considered sufficient 
reason for military action and thus involve an 
inestimable risk. Such a declaration is particu-
larly important in view of the threat to 
countries such as Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Oman, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. It implies a redeploy-
ment of American forces, particularly in the 
Indian Ocean, and, above all, much greater 
mobility. 
97. The West's aim is not and must in no 
case be to bring about a " division of the 
world " into two zones of influence but on the 
contrary to prevent Soviet policy imposing its 
views - as in Afghanistan - on countries which 
wish to remain non-aligned. The West can 
respond to the Soviet challenge by defending 
the freedom of peoples to choose their own 
course in their political, economic and social 
systems and in their external relations. This is 
the purpose of the measures taken by the 
United States. 
98. The Soviet Union must not be given the 
impression that this American reaction might 
bring the advantage of separating the United 
States from its European allies. Consequently, 
Europe must show unremitting interest in and 
support for American policy outside Europe, 
but this it will not do if procedure for consulta-
tion in the framework of NATO is not conside-
rably improved. 
99. Hence, for the sake of western security 
Europe must participate to a greater extent than 
in the past in decisions taken jointly by 
members of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly 
in the framework of the North Atlantic 
Council. Such participation is essential if 
there is to be a real increase in the sacrifices 
made by Europeans for the joint defence, finan-
cially and where troop levels are concerned, 
and if decisions taken by the American authori-
ties without consulting their European partners 
are not, as on several occasions in the recent 
past, to arouse misunderstandings and negative 
reactions among Europeans. It might also be 
said that, in the same way, decisions taken by 
one or other Western European country or even 
by the Nine on several occasions in recent 
months have aroused similar reactions among 
the American partners in the Atlantic Alliance 
because there was no prior consultation. The 
slow reactions of the Nine in following up the 
decisions taken by the United States regarding 
the crises in Iran and Afghanistan and the steps 
taken by the Nine to express their views on the 
Palestine situation provided several examples 
which are still fresh in our minds. Consulta-
tions between allies should be extended sys-
tematically to cover all aspects of the threat to 
the Atlantic Alliance, including those which 
concern its plans or its periphery and also the 
non-military aspects since a global challenge 
should be met by a global strategy. It is in no 
one's interest to exclude countries which are 
not able, or are not called upon, to take part in 
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military measures which might be taken by one 
country or another. 
100. Generally speaking, it seems clear that 
Europe is in no way willing or prepared to 
intervene in any way whatsoever in the Middle 
East whereas the United States is setting in plac~ the military means to counter a possible 
Soviet aggression in the area by stationing a 
naval force off the coast of Oman, reorganising 
its Diego Garcia base and building up, on 
American territory, a combat-ready force of 
110,000 men with the necessary air trans-
port. But this in no way means that Europe 
can or wishes to dissociate itself from this area, 
which is vital for its oil supplies. 
101. Certain European countries have forces 
capable of intervening outside the European 
theatre, particularly in Africa, where several 
military operations have been conducted on a 
limited scale in which others did not wish to or 
could not participate. Insofar as such opera-
tions concern the security of Europe and of the 
whole western world, they should be the subject 
of consultations between the partners in the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
102. These consultations should also cover 
doctrine for the use of weapons, particularly 
nuclear weapons. Countries without nuclear 
weapons are closely and directly concerned by 
the way the nuclear powers intend to use their 
forces, and in particular their tactical nuclear 
· weapons, in case of hostilities, since fighting 
would inevitably cover the whole territory of 
Europe. It should be added that a doctrine 
based on deterrence concerns all countries 
taking part in the deterrence, even if they do 
not make a nuclear contribution. 
103. Although the idea of a European nuclear 
force does not seem to conform to Europe's 
true possibilities today, this in no way means 
that the Western European countries have no 
interest in jointly examining their approach to 
the problem of their defence which can no 
longer, in present technical conditions, be 
ensured by each country in isolation. On the 
contrary, there is every reason for them to 
examine together how the forces of each 
country should be deployed in peacetime and 
used in wartime to ensure maximum effective-
ness and there is nothing to prevent these 
consultations also covering the use of nuclear 
weapons and their deployment in the NATO 
system. In view of the special status of the 
French deterrent and the role it plays in 
Europe's defence policy, consultations 
Franco-German in particular - on its use 
might make a useful contribution to the 
western deterrent. 
104. Finally, consultations should also cover 
all problems linked with the limitation of anna-
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ments, force reductions and disarmament. 
There is a problem with regard to the SALT 
negotiations where the American participants 
obviously kept their allies informed, in the 
framework of NATO, of the progress of work, 
but such consultations were sometimes inade-
quate or too late. Naturally, negotiations on 
mutual and balanced force reductions in 
Europe cannot succeed - and cannot even take 
place - without close consultation between all 
the members of NATO but, if these negotia-
tions are to be continued, it would be desirable 
for France to take part in them so that all the 
problems raised by maintaining or transforming 
the balance of force in Europe may be consi-
dered. Finally, the prospects of a meeting to 
be held in Madrid in autumn 1980 to examine 
and verify the application of decisions taken at 
the conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe and which is inter alia to cover 
confidence-building measures, or of a European 
disarmament conference proposed by France, 
imply the existence and operation of a system 
of close consultations between the members of 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
6. The frameworks of European co-operation 
105. Whether it is a question of armaments 
production, the preparation of disarmament 
negotiations, the limitation of forces and arma-
ments or events which concern international 
peace but which take place outside the area 
covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, there are 
obviously differences between the ways in 
which these matters are understood or 
handled on either side of the Atlantic. But if 
Europe wishes its American partners to listen 
to it, it must be in a position _to know, express_ 
and uphold it_!>_ views and interest~ in face of the 
United States which individual European states 
cannot do. The existence of a European pillar 
in a balanced alliance means Europe must exist 
politically. 
106. The European Community is of course 
the principal factor of cohesion of this Euro-
pean pillar, even if not all the European mem-
bers of the Alliance belong to the Community 
and certain members of the Community are not 
members of the Atlantic Alliance. Neverthe-
less, the establishment of a European economic 
entity expresses and strengthens de facto econo-
mic solidarity. This solidarity has been streng-
thened by the creation of a monetary union bet-
ween several countries and the recent election 
of the European Padiament by universal su-f-
frage which have made Europe more and more 
of a reality. However, in defence matters 
there is no satisfactory expression ofsolidarity 
since the Communities have no responsibilities 
in this area and certain Community countries 
are radically opposed to Community responsi-
bilities being extended to cover defence. 
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107. Although it is evident that joint industrial 
policy concerns the armaments field and nine-
power political consultations concern defence 
policy, which forms part of foreign policy, 
particularly where East-West relations are 
concerned, it does not seem possible at the 
present time to consider overcoming the 
obstacle constituted by opposition to extending 
the Community's work to include the military 
field. 
108. Furthermore, Western European Union 
which, under the modified Brussels Treaty, has 
undeniable defence responsibilities, does not at 
present have a sound basis of solidarity and has 
never been able to work out a European 
defence policy for lack of agreement between 
the European governments on this point. The 
second pillar of the Atlantic Alliance therefore 
in fact exists at economic level but it has never 
been possible to build anything solid in the 
field of foreign policy and still less in that of 
defence. 
I 09. Yet the development of the European 
Communities leads towards European defence 
policy being handled by Community bodies pri-
marily because of the place occupied by the 
armaments industry in the European economy, 
a place which is continually growing and 
which, thanks to the development of the latest 
technology, in particular in the nuclear, electro-
nic, computer and aircraft sectors, means 
that today the number and skill of firms work-
ing· for defence and armaments are growing. 
But for this reason it is increasingly difficult to 
distinguish firms working solely for the civil 
sector. Commercial, technological and finan-
cial exchanges between European industries are 
and will become ever more numerous, so a 
common industrial policy henceforth calls for a 
common armaments policy. 
110. Moreover, the Community has expressed 
the wish to give shape to the co-ordination of 
member countries' foreign policies in the 
framework of nine-power political consulta-
tions. This has had noticeable results and, 
during the first months of 1980, Community 
positions and declarations have been worked 
out on many matters relating to Euro-
pean security. But those consultations do not 
seem to have prevented certain governments 
from taking unilateral action, without warning 
their partners beforehand, in a number of 
matters which nevertheless related to the secu-
rity of Europe as a whole. The development 
of nine-power consultations, soon to be twelve 
or thirteen powers since there is talk of Turkey 
being associated with them even before it joins 
the EEC, and the practice of holding consul-
tations at short notice in the e-vent of emer-
gency are becoming an absolute necessity. 
111. Finally, the European Communities quite 
evidently constitute the hub round which the 
Europe of the -futu-re is in the process of 
organising itself which means that security and 
defence questions must one day find a 
place in the work of the Communities. The 
necessary immediate measures can therefore be 
of only a provisional nature and designed to 
prepare for this Community future of which 
there are now glimpses. 
112. The day the obstacles are removed - the 
present limitation of Community responsibili-
ties, the refusal by certain countries to have 
these responsibilities extended and the fact that 
several European members of the Alliance are 
not yet members of the EEC - it will probably 
be possible to achieve early and complete iden-
tity between the European Community and the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. 
V. The organisation of European security 
1. The modified Brussels Treaty 
113. In present circumstances, WEU is still 
the only truly European organisation with res-
ponsibility for defence matters, which should 
enable it to help to form the European pillar of 
the Atlantic Alliance. Article IV of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty confers this duty on it, pro-
viding for close co-operation between WEU and 
NATO: 
"In the execution of the treaty, the high 
contracting parties and any organs estab-
lished by them under the treaty shall 
work in close co-operation with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
Recognising the undesirability of dupli-
cating the military staffs of NATO, the 
Council and its Agency will rely on the 
appropriate military authorities of NATO 
for information and advice on military 
matters." 
114. There is therefore no legitimate reason 
for setting a European defence organisation, 
WEU, against the Atlantic Alliance since the 
Brussels Treaty was modified specifically in 
order to organise Europe's participation in 
western defence. However, the same treaty 
gave a special dimension to European solidarity 
in its Article V, which provides for all the 
WEU member countries to afford each other 
automatic assistance in the event of one of 
them being attacked. This is an extremely 
serious undertaking since the party attacked has 
to be afforded " all the ... assistance in their 
power " and is therefore far more binding than 
the corresponding article in the North Atlantic 
Treaty, which makes provision only for consul-
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tations in the event of an attack on one of the 
signatories. Consequently, any speculation there 
may be about the nature of the participation of 
any of the members of WEU in the common 
defence would be based on the supposition that 
the member concerned would not respect its 
signature, which there is no reason to think 
would be the case. 
115. Moreover, Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty is completed by Article VIII 
which set up a Council that can meet at short 
notice at the request of any one of the member 
countries to examine all matters relat-
ing to co-operation between these countries in 
every field so that the Alliance might effectively 
be based on true solidarity. 
116. But WEU suffers from a number of poli-
tical handicaps. First, it groups only some 
members of today's Community Europe and a 
fortiori a smaller proportion of the members of 
the future Community, which will probably 
have twelve or thirteen members. Moreover, 
the WEU Council has never really exercised all 
its responsibilities under the modified Brussels 
Treaty since, from the outset, it relied on 
NATO for everything relating to defence proper 
and the exercise of its cultural and social res-
ponsibilities was subsequently handed over to 
the Council of Europe. Since the accession of 
the United Kingdom to the European Commu-
nity, it has relied wholly on the Community to 
exercise its economic responsibilities, and the 
development of nine-power consultations has 
removed much of the substance of consultations 
held in the WEU Council. 
117. The Council as it now is no longer plays 
any role at all. This might be welcome if its 
responsibilities were effectively exercised satis-
factorily in wider frameworks. This is ob-
viously not so for all that relates to defence 
and armaments, and the weakness of the WEU 
Council corresponds to a very real weakness of 
Europe. 
118. The modified Brussels Treaty also inclu-
des differences between the rights and obliga-
tions of its members which were perfectly com-
prehensible at a time when, less than ten years 
after the end of the second world war, the pro-
tocol modifying the Brussels Treaty was drawn 
up, signed and ratified. Some of these inequa-
lities are still topical. For instance, the fact 
·that the United Kingdom has to maintain an 
army and an air force on the territory of the 
Federal Republic is as necessary as ever for 
Europe's security. Similarly, the Federal 
Republic has no desire to have the restrictions 
on the production of NBC weapons lifted as it 
has no intention of acquiring them. 
119. Conversely, the restrictions on the pro-
duction of conventional weapons by the Federal 
Republic hindered the competitive capacity of 
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that country's naval industries without meeting 
any present need and made it more difficult for 
the Federal Republic to take part in a joint 
armaments policy until the WEU Council deci-
ded, on 21st July 1980, to accede to Germany's 
request by removing the naval restrictions 
imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany. 
120. Finally, there are differences of interpre-
tation about the way certain powers intend to 
fulfil their undertakings in the event of a crisis. 
This applies essentially to France, which 
withdrew from the NATO integrated com-
mands at the time it developed its nuclear 
force. It is understandable that the French 
Government should wish there to be some un-
certainty about the cases in which it would 
engage its nuclear force. This is in the interest 
of the joint deterrent, in view of the fact that 
France has never questioned its signature of the 
North Atlantic Treaty or the modified Brussels 
Treaty which commits the French nuclear force 
under Article IV. Nevertheless, this ambiguity, 
particularly when it extends to the deployment 
of France's conventional forces in the Federal 
Republic, may be a factor of weakness for 
Europe if France's withdrawal from NATO is 
not offset by its close participation in military 
consultations between the European members 
of the Atlantic Alliance. 
2. WEU bodies 
121. If WEU is to play its due role in setting 
up the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, 
its structures must be adapted to Europe's joint 
defence ambitions. In particular, the Council 
should regularly include defence questions on 
its agenda, including matters relating to disar-
mament, which means that the Ministers of 
Defence or their representatives should take 
part in the work of the Council. As long as 
the WEU Council only includes representatives 
of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs, it is hard 
to see how it could co-operate effectively in 
building a European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance. The Council might also meet at an 
appropriate level prior to meetings of the North 
Atlantic Council so as to ascertain Europe's 
point of view on matters to be handled subse-
quently in the Atlantic framework. 
122. It would also be advisable to make full 
use of the Standing Armaments Committee, as 
your Rapporteur has suggested above. In its 
reply to Recommendation 331, the Council 
recently agreed that the SAC might carry out 
work for the Assembly. It is now for the 
Assembly to avail itself of this possibility, but 
such co-operation must not be detrimental, as 
the Council specifies, moreover, to the pursuit 
of the SAC's normal work or of its present 
study; placing a ministerial institution at the 
disposal of a parliamentary body must in no 
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way be taken to mean that the government 
authorities are losing interest in that institution. 
123. Finally, WEU should be enlarged to 
include all the members, and consequently also 
the new members, of the EEC so as to involve 
them more closely in the examination of the 
requirements of joint security. Article XI of 
the modified Brussels Treaty provides for such 
enlargement and there is no need to let it lapse, 
although it has never been applied in the 
twenty-five years of WEU's existence. 
124. Consideration of all the questions raised 
by this necessary adaptation of the structures of 
WEU to the realities of European security 
should be undertaken immediately since it 
meets an urgent need both in the field of arma-
ments and in that of Europe's defence and secu-
rity. It is naturally the WEU Council that will 
have to assume responsibility for this examina-
tion and to this end it should set up a perma-
nent working group on which member coun-
tries would be represented. This group should 
be instructed to decide on measures to be taken 
with regard to the activities of WEU, including 
the revision of Protocol No. Ill, action to be 
taken on the SAC's study, the possible enlar-
gement of WEU to include all member coun-
tries of the European Community and the 
countries which have applied for membership 
and the new course to be given to the Council's 
work, with all the implications this may have, 
inter alia through the effective participation of 
representatives of the Ministries of Defence. 
125. Moreover, the WEU Assembly must be 
associated with this work and it should instruct 
the General Affairs Committee, through offi-
cially-communicated information, to follow the 
work of the Council and consider what subse-
quent action should be taken. 
3. The WEU Assembly 
126. The WEU Assembly for its part might 
play an active part in setting up the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Community. As the 
European parliamentary organisation responsi-
ble for defence, armaments and disarmament 
matters, set up under Article IX of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, it has sole responsibility for 
defence matters. At the present juncture, it 
would not be reasonable to call in question the 
modified Brussels Treaty in view of the security 
benefits Europe derives from Article V. All 
the governments seem agreed on this point. 
The full treaty must therefore be applied effec-
tively, including Article IX which specifies that 
the Assembly shall be "composed of represen-
tatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Eur-
ope", while allowing the WEU Assembly to 
become the effective parliament of Europe in 
areas which are its sole responsibility. 
127. However, it is clear that, because it was 
elected by direct universal suffrage, the Euro-
pean Parliament is destined to become the par-
liamentary component of the Europe of tomor-
row. In the future it will therefore be its task 
to constitute the parliamentary element of a 
Community whose responsibilities would be 
extended to cover defence and armaments 
matters and it would be logical for the WEU 
Assembly and the European Parliament to be 
brought closer together now. It is not possible 
to have identical membership in the immediate 
future because the modified Brussels Treaty 
specifies that it is the delegations of the WEU 
countries to the Council of Europe Assembly 
that constitute the delegations to the WEU 
Assembly and, very soon, these delegations, or 
most of them at least, will no longer include 
any members of the European Parliament 
because of the latter's election by direct univer-
sal suffrage which often makes plurality of 
office impossible de facto if not de jure. 
128. Furthermore, the WEU Assembly has an 
organic link with the national parliaments 
which alone can supervise member states' 
defence policies and it is through these parlia-
ments that the WEU Assembly can and does 
exercise an influence - naturally difficult to 
assess - on national defence policies and hence 
on Europe's defence policy since this is still a 
mere conglomeration of national policies. 
129. However, the WEU Assembly must here 
and now associate itself with the European Par-
liament, which represents some 250 million 
inhabitants of Western Europe, will represent 
even more in a few years' time and supervises 
the European Communities over which it exer-
cises effective powers. 
130. Cutting the links between the European 
Parliament and the national parliaments has at 
the same time the effect of conferring specific 
legitimacy on the European Parliament because 
it is based on the will of its European electo-
rate. A connection between the two assemblies 
seems clearly necessary, but for the time being 
this cannot be done officially. A connection is 
possible however through the appointment of 
permanent observers to each other's assembly. 
131. Answering Senator Boucheny on 6th 
June 1980, Mr. Fran~ois-Poncet, French Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs, said: 
" There is no provision in the Brussels 
Treaty or the Rules of Procedure of the 
WEU Assembly for inviting observers. 
To create special observer status for a 
delegation from the assembly of the 
European Communities would be to dis-
regard the respective responsibilities of 
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the WEU Assembly and of the assembly 
of the European Communities, the latter 
not being competent to discuss arma-
ments or defence questions. As far as 
the French Government is aware, more-
over, no such proposal has yet been sub-
mitted to the Assembly or the Presiden-
tial Committee of WEU." 
132. This answer invites comment for, 
although the composition of the WEU Assem-
bly was specified in the treaty, the invitation of 
observers has never been the subject of any pro-
visions by the governments which have always 
accepted the practice of all the European par-
liamentary assemblies inviting parliamentary 
observers. There is wide experience of this 
since observers from the parliaments of several 
non-member countries of WEU, members of 
the Atlantic Alliance, attend each of the WEU 
Assembly's sessions. 
133. Observers sent by the European Parlia-
ment to the WEU Assembly might however 
play a larger role. They might, for instance, be 
more numerous - a figure of about twenty 
might be agreed upon, which would represent 
hardly more than a fifth of the number of mem-
bers of the WEU Assembly - but, unlike obser-
vers from national parliaments, they would no 
longer have to confine their speeches to matters 
of direct concern to their countries. Every-
thing that concerns Europe concerns the Euro-
pean Parliament, so its observers should have 
all the rights of members of the WEU Assem-
bly, i.e. the right to speak and the right to 
attend committee meetings. Only the right to 
vote could obviously not be granted to them. 
134. Your Rapporteur realises this proposal 
arouses some mistrust and reservation among 
· members of the WEU Assembly. However, he 
wishes to recall that the modified Brussels 
Treaty was drafted and adopted at a time when 
the European Parliament did not exist. Had it 
then existed, the WEU Assembly would have 
been associated with that parliament rather 
than with the Council of Europe for consti-
tuting its delegations. 
135. At the present juncture, it is therefore 
normal to allow all the main tendencies in the 
European Parliament to be represented in a 
delegation of observers which should be large 
enough, but not so large as to upset the normal 
course of work in the WEU Assembly. Insofar 
as these observers would not be entitled to vote, 
this would have no effect on Article IX of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. Their presence 
would obviously not be as beneficial to the 
European Parliament as to the WEU Assembly 
since the latter would be able to take advantage 
of the potential strength of the European Parlia-: 
ment and its political groups, wbereas the Euro-
pean Parliament would have Tittle to expect of 
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observers sent to it by the WEU Assembly, 
except perhaps for the link with the national 
parliaments which it will be lacking in the near 
future. 
136. In any event, if some such solution is not 
found in the fairly near future, it will be impos-
sible to prevent the European Parliament from 
discussing matters which are as vital for Europe 
as peace and war, security, detente and disar-
mament. To take cover behind claims of ex-
clusive responsibility will remain without effect. 
It is better to make the most of a situation than 
to hide one's head in the sand without a 
thought for the future. 
13 7. In the long run, it is hoped before the 
end of this new decade, such participation 
should lead to a merger of the two assemblies in 
a single European Parliament with universal 
powers, i.e. capable of being the true parlia-
ment of a Europe master of its destiny. The 
present proposal merely paves the way for this 
solution, without requiring any revision of the 
modified Brussels Treaty or of the treaty setting 
up the European Community. It is hard to see 
what principle could be invoked for refusing to 
allow the members of Europe's Parliament to 
take part in the work of the only European 
assembly with responsibilities in defence mat-
ters. 
VI. Conclusions 
138. As Professor Wilhelm Grewe, former Per-
manent Representative of the Federal Republic 
to NATO, said in a recent speech at Wolfsburg: 
"Criticism within the Alliance is inevitable and 
legitimate, but it must be constructive and 
strengthen its resolve, not just assert verbal soli-
darity in order to evade the issue. " This is 
the sense of the present report. 
139. A few obvious facts should therefore be 
recalled: 
(z) Although detente and disarmament are 
Europe's goals, it cannot consider sacrificing its 
security for them, as was stressed in the Harmel 
report which, already in 1967, examined mea-
sures to be taken to achieve a better balance in 
NATO. 
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(iz) Security is above all the result of deter-
rence, ensured mainly by the United States, and 
means maintaining American forces in Europe 
as a guarantee of the United States' determina-
tion to defend Europe by every means at its dis-
posal. 
(iii) It is therefore ensured by the cohesion of 
the Atlantic Alliance and by all the forces that 
NATO can earmark for a strategy of flexible 
response. 
(iv) Cohesion. essential for meeting both poli-
tical and military threats, means the Alliance 
must rest on a strong European pillar, based on 
the awareness of the European members of the 
Alliance of the interdependence of their desti-
nies. 
(v) Any adaptation of the Alliance to a 
world in which threats are becoming increasing-
ly imminent depends on the formation of the 
European pillar. 
(vi) This calls for a regrouping of the Western 
European countries, the elaboration of a com-
mon armaments policy and close co-ordination 
of their foreign and defence policies, also cover-
ing areas outside the North Atlantic Treaty 
area. 
(viz) The European Community is the natural 
framework for this regrouping. 
(viiz) At the present juncture, WEU is still the 
only European organisation in which member· 
countries are required to co-ordinate their 
defence policies. 
(ix) Consequently, WEU must be quickly 
adapted to the present requirements of the 
Atlantic Alliance so that it may help to form 
the European pillar of the Alliance. 
(x) At the same time, WEU must help to 
prepare the future, which, in the parliamentary 
field, means establishing permanent links bet-
ween the WEU Assembly and the European 
Parliament. 
(xz) To this end, the WEU Assembly should 
extend a permanent invitation to observers 
from the European Parliament to take part in 
all its work, but without the right to vote. 
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